GARY L. LANCASTER, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff's Complaint was received by the Clerk of Courts on January 11, 2008 and was referred to Chief United States Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrate Judges.
The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 284) filed on June 3, 2011, recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant La Plata County District Court (Doc. No. 184) be granted. Service was made on all counsel of record and pro se Plaintiff Daniel J. Goodson, III. The parties were informed that in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), and Local Rule of Court 72.D.2., the parties had fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file objections to the Report and Recommendation. No objections have been filed. After review of the pleadings and the documents in the case, together with the Report and Recommendation, the following Order is entered:
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 184) filed by Defendant District Court of La Plata County, Colorado be granted.
Plaintiff Daniel J. Goodson III (hereinafter "Father" or "Plaintiff") is a pro se individual who has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 on behalf of himself and his four minor children, D.G. VI, J.G., S.G. and
Plaintiff asserts violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 36 at Overview.) The Amended Complaint contains a plethora of different claims regarding a variety of different situations. The majority of the claims, however, stem from custody proceedings regarding Father's children in the state courts of Pennsylvania and Colorado (hereinafter the "underlying custody matter"). Plaintiffs have named 37 different defendants who are judges, courts, court employees, county commissioners and controllers, social workers employed by various county children and youth services, the mothers of Father's children, Father's former counsel, foster parents, a guardian ad litem, a state trooper, a prison official, a sheriff, and state and federal prosecutors.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant La Plata District Court. D.G. VI, J.G., and S.G (collectively "children") were born to Father and his former wife, Defendant Tara Thompson ("Thompson"). (ECF No. 36 at Synopsis.) According to Plaintiff, Father and Thompson divorced in 2000, and he filed for custody of the children in Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas ("Westmoreland County Court"). (ECF No. 36 at Synopsis.) In the meantime, Thompson and children moved to Colorado and she filed for divorce in the La Plata County District Court in Durango, Colorado (hereinafter "Colorado Court"). (ECF No. 36 at Synopsis.) Defendant Judge John Driscoll of the Westmoreland County Court relinquished jurisdiction of the case to the Colorado Court. (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 31.) During all or most of these four years, Father was incarcerated in Allegheny County Jail. (ECF No. 36 at Synopsis.) Father's parental rights to D.G. VI, J.G., and S.G were involuntarily terminated by the Colorado Court in 2004. (ECF No. 36 at Synopsis.)
Plaintiff seeks generally declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief against all Defendants. (ECF No. 36 at Posture.) With regard to the Colorado Court, which has filed the instant motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests the following injunctive and/or declaratory relief:
In his response (ECF No. 210) to the Colorado Court's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states that the following averments of the Amended Complaint are directed against the Colorado Court (as well as other defendants):
The Court must liberally construe the factual allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint because pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e) requires that all pleadings be construed "so as to do justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 339 F.Supp.2d 689, 692 (W.D.Pa.2004) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977)); Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.2000). In the case at bar, the Colorado Court presents a facial challenge. (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 195 at 3.) In a
In support of its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Colorado Court argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because under Colorado law, it is an agency of the State of Colorado. The Colorado Court also argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in that Plaintiff seeks appellate-type review of a final judgment of the Colorado Court. In response, Plaintiff contends that the Colorado Court was acting in its individual capacity and its actions were so egregious that it has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff also argues that this case involves a state court conspiracy and does not involve a Colorado state court judgment. Finally, Plaintiff concedes that he "seeks no redress for injuries of their unlawful and highly questionable court proceedings... but here Plaintiff[ ] seek[s] redress as to the State Law claims/violations perpetrated by these Defendants in their individual capacities while on some occasions during official actions." (Plaintiff's Answer to Motion to Dismiss, ECF. No. 210 at 2.)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993). A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (May 18, 2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The Supreme Court further explained:
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Recently, in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed its decision in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir.2008) (construing Twombly in a civil rights context), and described how the Rule 12(b)(6) standard had changed in light of Twombly and Iqbal as follows:
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.
Thereafter, In light of Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2009), set forth a two-prong test to be applied by the district courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim:
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
In support of the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Colorado Court argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a matter of law because States and their agencies are not persons with the meaning of §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986. In addition, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Further, Plaintiff's claims fail to satisfy the facial plausibility requirements of Twombly.
Plaintiff responds that the "Amended Complaint clearly places Defendants on notice and shows entitlement of relief that is plausible on its face." (Plaintiff's Answer to Motion to Dismiss, ECF. No. 210 at 2.)
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the proper vehicle for asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity because the Eleventh Amendment "is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1996).
The Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights suits against a state in federal court by private parties where the state has not consented to such action. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978)). This immunity applies even to claims seeking injunctive relief. Id.; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding Eleventh Amendment immunity applies "regardless of the nature of the relief sought."). Eleventh Amendment immunity protects entities created by state governments that operate as alter egos or arms of the State. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a judicially-created doctrine that bars lower federal courts from reviewing certain state court actions. The doctrine originated from two Supreme Court opinions: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that a United States District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments of a state court, because only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303.
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, the Supreme Court emphasized the narrowness of the doctrine and held that Rooker-Feldman is "confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejections of those judgments." 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 544 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Exxon Mobil, id.).
Shortly after the Supreme Court's determination in Exxon Mobil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, while acknowledging the recent Exxon Mobil decision, still applied the two-step Rooker-Feldman inquiry that it had applied in the past—a claim in federal court will be barred by Rooker-Feldman under two circumstances: "first, if the federal claim was actually litigated in state court prior to the filing of the federal action or, second, if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong." In Re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir.2005). More recently, however, the court of appeals has cautioned that reliance on its pre-Exxon formulation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and in particular the "inextricably intertwined" prong, may no longer be appropriate. See, e.g., Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); East Hill Synagogue v. City of Englewood, 240 Fed.Appx. 938, 940 n. 1 (3d Cir.2007) (noting that after Mobil, "[t]here is little reason to believe that inextricably intertwined' ... does anything more than state a conclusion or describe a claim that meets the requirements of Exxon.") (collecting decisions from other courts of appeals).
In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected its pre-Exxon Mobil formulation of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry, and established the following test, based on the Supreme Court's holding in Exxon Mobil:
Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517). Furthermore, in formulating the four-part test, the court of appeals determined that the phrase "inextricably intertwined" neither created an additional legal test nor expanded the scope of the doctrine beyond challenges to state-court judgments. Id. at 170. Rather, "[t]he purpose of the [phrase had been] to highlight that a challenge to a judgment is barred even if the claim forming the basis of the challenge was not raised in the state proceedings." Id. (alteration to original) (citing Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1141 (10th Cir.2006)). Hence, the court of appeals opined that the phrase is no more than "a descriptive label attached to claims that meet the requirements outlined in Exxon Mobil." Id. at 170 (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir.2005)).
The court of appeals in Great Western found that the key to determining whether Rooker-Feldman barred a claim lies within the second and fourth requirements of the four-part test. 615 F.3d at 166. Essentially,
Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added) (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87-88). By contrast, the court of appeals noted that in the following example, the source of the injury was the defendants' actions (as opposed to the state court judgment), even though the federal lawsuit asks the federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court:
Id. at 167 (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88). The court of appeals further explained that a useful guidepost in determining the source of the injury is the injury's timing, "that is, whether the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court proceedings and thus could not have been caused by' those proceedings." Id.
The fourth requirement of the four-part test—that the plaintiff must invite federal court review and rejection of the state court judgment—is closely related to the second requirement. Id. at 168 (quoting Bolden, 441 F.3d at 1143). The fourth requirement focuses, however, on "whether the federal plaintiff's claims will require appellate review of state-court decisions by the district court." Id. at 169. Moreover, it looks at the relief that is requested by the plaintiff.
In Great Western, the plaintiff claimed that due to an alleged conspiracy between the arbitrator, numerous attorneys, and state court judges, the state court's decisions had been predetermined before the hearing had taken place, violating its constitutional right to a fair hearing. Id. at 171. When addressing the second and fourth requirements, the court of appeals relied on the reasoning used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in two separate cases with similar claims. Id.
In Nesses v. Shepard, the Great Western court observed that "the federal plaintiff alleged that his losses in state court were the product of a conspiracy among the judges and lawyers." Id. (citing Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995)). But even though the Great Western court acknowledged that the federal plaintiff was, in a sense, attacking the ruling and decision of the state court, because the federal plaintiff "alleged that, `people involved in the decision violated some independent right of his, such as the right (if
Next, the Great Western court noted the reasoning of the court of appeals in Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir.2002). In that case, the plaintiff contended that her relatives and certain officials had "`conspired—prior to any judicial involvement—to cause false child neglect proceedings to be filed, resulting in her removal from her home in violation of her ... substantive and procedural due process rights[.]'" Great Western, 615 F.3d at 172 (quoting Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 665). Whether the alleged conspiracy would have caused the plaintiff to suffer any damages, absent the state court order, was found to be irrelevant. Id. The Brokaw court held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the plaintiff's claim, "`because her claim for damages [was] based on an alleged independent violation of her constitutional rights. It was this separate constitutional violation which caused the adverse state court decision.'" Id. (quoting Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 667).
In applying the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court in Great Western found that the federal plaintiff was "not merely contending that the state-court decisions were incorrect or that they were themselves in violation of the Constitution. Instead, [the federal plaintiff] claim[ed] that people involved in the decision violated some independent right,' that is, the right to an impartial forum." Id. (quoting Nesses, 68 F.3d at 1005). Because the federal plaintiff based its claim on an alleged independent violation of its constitutional rights, the Great Western court found that actions of the defendants and members of Pennsylvania judiciary, and not the state court decisions themselves, were the source of the federal plaintiff's purported injury. Id. (quoting Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 667).
Although the court of appeals' finding on the second requirement was enough to render Rooker-Feldman inapplicable to the case, the Great Western court examined the facts as applied to the fourth requirement as well. Id. at 173. The court of appeals found that "if [the federal plaintiff] could prove the existence of a conspiracy to reach a predetermined outcome in state court, it could recover nominal damages for this due process violation." Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262-64, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252). Because the merits of the state court decisions were immaterial to the existence of the alleged violation, the court of appeals held that the federal plaintiff's "entitlement to such damages could be assessed without any analysis of the state-court judgments. To recover for more than the alleged due process violation, however, [the federal plaintiff] would have to show that the adverse state-court decisions were entered erroneously." Id. (citing Nesses, 68 F.3d at 1005).
Nevertheless, the Great Western court found that this is not the type of appellate review that is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. The relief requested by the plaintiffs in both Rooker and Feldman, who were seeking to have the state-court decisions undone or declared null and void by the federal courts, required effectively overruling the state-court judgments. Id. (citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414, 44 S.Ct. 149; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 468-69, 103 S.Ct. 1303). To differentiate, the federal plaintiff
In the instant matter, the Court finds that all four requirements of Great Western are met with regard to the claims against the Colorado Court seeking the following relief:
First, Father was the losing party in the custody action with regard to D.G. IV., J.G. and S.G., which was transferred to the Colorado Court in 2000. Father's parental rights to D.G. IV, J.G., and S.G. were subsequently terminated in the Colorado Court in 2004. Second, it is clear that the source of Plaintiff's alleged injuries in this federal action is the Colorado state court judgment terminating Father's parental rights. Father is now suing in federal court for the reinstitution of his parental rights, an award of custody to the paternal grandparents, and return of jurisdiction over the custody matters to the Pennsylvania state court. It is clear from Plaintiff's declaratory and injunctive requests for relief set out above that he is seeking reversal of the Colorado judgment. Plaintiff is, in essence, seeking appellate review of the Colorado state court judgment, and therefore, the Court finds that the source of Plaintiff's alleged injuries as to these claims seeking equitable relief is the state court judgment issued in the Colorado Court. The third requirement is also satisfied here because it is clear that the state court judgment entered by the Colorado Court was issued in 2004, well before the present litigation was commenced. Finally, the fourth requirement of Great Western is satisfied because, as discussed, Plaintiff specifically seeks an injunction barring enforcement of the Colorado state court judgment, the restoration of Father's parental rights, an award of custody to the paternal grandparents, which, if granted, would effectuate a reversal of the Colorado state court judgment. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the Colorado Court seeking the equitable relief set out above.
According to Great Western, however, Father's claims for violation of his federal constitutional rights and conspiracy for which he seeks monetary damages, are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. The source of Plaintiff's injuries as to these claims is not the Colorado state court judgment. Instead, the source of Plaintiff's alleged injuries are the alleged actions of Defendants in participating in the claimed conspiracy. Even though these injuries helped to cause the Colorado state court judgment, these claims are independent because they stemmed from the alleged
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.1994) (emphasis added). Similarly, § 1985(3) and 1986 provide for actions against a person or persons.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that Congress did not intend for Section 1983 to overcome the sovereign immunity of states embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Therefore, states, as well as entities of the state, such as the District Court of La Plata County, are not "persons" who can be subject to liability under Section 1983. Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims against the Colorado Court pursuant to §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 must be dismissed as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has noted that where "suits against individual state officers [are] for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law." Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir.2002) (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir.2001)). This exception is commonly referred to as the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). See Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, 297 F.3d at 323. The Supreme Court has narrowly applied this exception, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), and indeed, has declined to apply the exception to relief styled as prospective relief but which, in actuality, seeks compensation
Here, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Colorado Court are barred because in actuality, the so-called prospective relief sought against it is not prospective at all. An examination of the injunctive and/or declaratory relief requested in the complaint reveals that five (5) of the requests for injunctive/declaratory relief arguably pertain to Judge Walker: 1) declare the Colorado Court's judgment null and void and reverse; 2) order that the names of the minor children be changed back to their birth names; 3) order that D.G. IV, J.G., and S.G. be returned to Pennsylvania and that they be placed under the guardianship of their paternal grandparents; 4) order that jurisdiction in all custody matters be remanded to the Westmoreland County Court and Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services; and 5) order that an injunction issue to disqualify the Colorado Court and relieve it of any jurisdiction. None of this relief would end an ongoing violation of federal law. These requests are purely an attempt by Father to have this Court review the prior decisions of the state court judges, which it is not empowered to do.
In light of the above, the Court will not address Defendant's arguments regarding the Anti-Injunction Act.
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant District Court of La Plata County's Motion to Dismiss at ECF No. 194 be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), and Local Rule of Court 72.D.2., the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.
Dated: June 3, 2011.
